"IN GOD WE TRUST": THE CULTURAL AND
SOCIAL IMPACT OF AFFINITY FRAUD IN THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN CHURCH
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

Across the United States, millions of dollars are being stolen
from innocent churchgoers by con artists claiming to share in their
religious beliefs. Far from a paranoid conspiracy theory, affinity fraud
has posed a significant harm to churches and congregations,
specifically those with high percentages of minorities, and the
dramatic rise in incidents of affinity fraud over the past several years'
has become a major concern for securities regulators at both federal
and state levels. In a typical affinity fraud scheme, perpetrators target
other members of the same racial, religious or ethnic group by creating
an illusion of a shared allegiance or affinity to a common cause or
experience. 2 Because the trust implicit among members of a particular
religious or ethnic group can be especially strong if the members of
that group consider themselves to be socially marginalized, affinity
fraud is a particularly effective scam in minority groups with a
documented 3 history of oppression, like the African American
community.

* David E.Austin. B.A., University of Pennsylvania. J.D. Candidate, University of
Maryland School of Law, 2005. I would like to thank Lisa Fairfax, Associate Professor of
Law at the University of Maryland School of Law and Lucy Cardwell for their information
and help. I would also like to thank Roy Albert for his comments when revising this article.
1. The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) has ranked
affinity fraud as the fifth most common scam, based on data received from state securities
regulators. See NASAA, State Securities Regulators Release Top 10 Scams, Schemes, &
Scandals, at http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa newsrooni/newsjreleases/392.cftn, (last visited Feb. 10,
2005).
2. See W. Mark Sendrow, Affinity Fraud: The Ultimate Confidence Game, Arizona
Corporation Commission Securities Division, at http://64.233.179.104 (last visited July 15,
2004).
3. In one scheme in New Jersey, an African American perpetrator of affinity fraud
suggested to his victims that their shared experience as targets of the long history of economic
oppression faced by their community mandated they take advantage of certain investments.
See Lisa M. Fairfax, "With Friends Like These...: " Towards a More Efficacious Response to
Affinity-Based Securities and Investment Fraud,36 GA. L. REv. 63, 79-80 (2001) [hereinafter
Fairfax]. See generally Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup
Situation: A Cognitive-MotivationalAnalysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307 (1979) (finding that
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Affinity fraud is different from a garden-variety investment
scam because perpetrators base their credibility on intra-racial and
intra-religious trust,4 thus implying to their victims that "you can trust
me, because I'm like you." 5 Often focusing on a characteristic both
the group and the perpetrator share-such as a common racial
background, or religious affiliation-perpetrators claim that their
investments will advance the social and economic interests of the
group. 6 Scam artists then abuse this trust by using it to convince
victims to invest in nonexistent or highly speculative investments. 7
Affinity fraud is effective for several reasons. First, victims
are often financially inexperienced and become embarrassed when
they fall prey to a con artist, so are therefore reluctant to report the
crime. 8 This reluctance to involve securities regulators also can be
attributed to a negative impression of law enforcement, 9 and a desire to
resolve the problem within the group rather than through outside
help. 10 Second, perpetrators make their financial products more
appealing not only by promising that investors will "get rich quick,"
but also by promising these investments will have a community
benefit. However, once money has been given to the perpetrator,
victims find that they have been "had" as part of a Ponzi scheme, 1
been given bad financial advice, or simply had their money stolen.12
members within a racial group, specifically those with a history of oppression, share an
inherent sense of trust among group members).
4. See NASAA, Affinity Fraud: Beware of Swindlers Who Claim Loyalty to Your
Group, at http://www.nasaa.org/InvestorEducation/InvestorAlerts..Tips/1679.cfm (last
visited January 15, 2001).
5. See Mark Griffin, Remarks by NASAA PresidentMark J. Griffin, Columbus Club,
Union Station Press Conference, November 12, 1997, North Am, Sec, Administrators
Association, at http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa/scripts/fu windowdisplay.asp?usid=0&refr118
(last visited Aug. 1, 2004).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 128. Perpetrators of religious-based affinity fraud often
use the argument that the government is persecuting them as a means of gaining loyalty. In
addition, perpetrators sometimes convince group members that reporting the scheme will
prevent victims from ever seeing return on their investment. See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 129.
10. See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 101.
11. As explained in Stuart R. Cohn, The Impact of Securities Laws on Developing
Companies:

Would the Wright Brothers Have Gotten Off the Ground?, 3 J. SMALL &

EMERGING Bus. L. 315, 350 n.99 (1999):
A Ponzi scheme is one that involves using new investor money to pay
older investors a promised interest or other economic return. Investors are
not aware of this circular use of invested funds and are falsely led to
believe that the economic return is being generated by company

2004]

Affinity Fraudin the African American Church

367

The August 2004 Federal Trade Commission report on
consumer fraud in the United States indicates that 24% of all African
Americans are likely to fall victim to fraud;' 3 this makes them almost
2.5 times more likely than non-Hispanic whites' 4 to become the target
of a scam. In addition, the 2004 report on minority buying power from
the Selig Center at the University of Georgia notes that African
Americans will see an increase in discretionary income at a compound5
ethnic group.'
annual growth rate of 6% annually, the greatest of any
With this susceptibility to fraud and an increase in disposable income,
African Americans are likely targets for affinity schemes.
This article examines the unique social and legal problems of
affinity fraud, specifically among African American church
congregations, which are becoming a preferred venue for scam

operations, which are usually minimal or nonexistent. The term "Ponzi
Scheme" is derived from the notorious activities of Charles Ponzi in
Boston, beginning in December 1919. Ponzi offered investors a 50%
return on short-term notes, claiming that his company would earn huge
amounts through the international trading of postal coupons. Interest
payments were made on a timely basis, causing others to believe in the
merits of the company. In fact, no business operations were ever
undertaken. Ponzi collected over $14 million within eight months and
made payments of approximately $9 million to his investors. The scheme
was finally exposed in 1920 by a Boston newspaper. Ponzi was sentenced
to prison, from which he was paroled after three years. Following a
second conviction several years later for a real estate fraud, he was
deported to Italy and was employed by Mussolini in the Ministry of
Finance.
Id. See also In re Ponzi, 268 F. 997 (D. Mass. 1920).
Ponzi schemes, such as the one involved in Financial Warfare, often fall under the
purview of Federal Securities laws. The term "security" covers a broad range of investments.
See 15 U.S.C.A.. § 77(b)(a)(1) (2000) (indicating that the term "securities" covers not only
financial instruments commonly considered "securities," like stocks and bonds, but also
investment vehicles such as interests in a Ponzi scheme). These interests are often called
"investment contracts," which has been defined by the Supreme Court as the investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits derived from the efforts of others. See SEC v.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
12. See SEC, Affinity Fraud: How to Avoid Investment Scams that Target Groups, at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/affinity.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2005) (defining affinity
fraud).
13. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Conswner Fraudin the United States: An FIC Swvy, 55-61 (Aug.
By
2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/consumerfraud/040805confraudrpt.pdf.
comparison, only 6.4% of non-Hispanic whites have a likelihood of falling victim to fraud.
See id.
14. See id. at 62.
15. See The Selig Center, Univ. of Ga., The Multicultural Economy 2004: America's
Minority Buying Power, 3, [hereinafter Selig Center Report], availableat
http://www.selig.uga.edu/forecast/GBEC/GBEC043Q.pdf.
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artists, 16 and uses the 2003 case of Financial Warfare' 7 to provide a
glimpse into the mechanics of how trust and charitable impulses
among members in an urban, African American church are exploited.
It begins by describing the mechanics of church-based affinity fraud in
an African American congregation by using the Financial Warfare
scam as an example of the methodologies con artists use to target
victims.1 8 This article then proposes that punishment for all active
participants in church-based affinity fraud can justified based on both
traditional securities laws and the current status of the church as a
benevolent social organization in African American communities.
African American churches not only serve as houses of worship, but as
centers for education and self-betterment. This concept of selfbetterment, and the church's role as a catalyst for such goals, are at the
core of congregants' natural desire to build wealth and improve their
lifestyle.
In addition, ministers who perpetrate affinity fraud or assist in
these schemes should also be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. The
relationship of special trust, implicit between minister and congregant,
is violated when a minister invites or assists scam artists to give
financial presentations in his or her church, should warrant increased
punishment. This relationship between clergy and church member is
not only based on a common faith, but also a common race. Breach of
fiduciary duty claims can and should be used by regulatory agencies
when prosecuting affinity fraud. Although African American churches
have functioned as extra-religious social organizations throughout
American history, financial advice cannot be viewed as part of the
ecclesiastical message of the church, and therefore is not protected by
the First Amendment.

16. See E. Scott Reckard, Preying Through the Pulpit, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at IA,
available at 2005 WL 56322960; see also Normal Arey, Guilty Verdict in Church Fraud,
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Feb. 8, 2005, at B5, available at 2005 WL 73610487.

17 See Complaint, SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, et al., Civil Action No. 02-7156 (E.D. Pa.
filed Sept. 5, 2002) at 38,
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complrl7714.htm (last visited Dec. 15,
2004); In re: Fin. Warfare Club Inc., et al., No. OAH-SD-51-200100002 (Md. 2002).
18. The information in this section is based on a videotaped presentation delivered at a
church in Maryland by Marcus Dukes and Teresa Hodge, the con artists behind the Financial
Warfare scheme, and describes remedies currently available to securities regulators in
prosecuting affinity fraud. See Videotape: Seminar Presented by Financial Warfare, Inc.,
Baltimore, MD, # CEOOO 1817 [hereinafter Financial Warfare Videotape].
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In sum, African American churches have traditionally been
involved in re-investing in the communities of which they are a part.
Although the goal of returning money to the community is not novel to
African Americans, the African American church plays a prominent
role in effectuating that goal. Existing securities laws provide an
avenue for prosecuting perpetrators, however, securities regulators
should seek enhanced civil and criminal penalties based on the status
19
of the African American church as a charitable institution.

II. THE BACKGROUND OF AFFINITY FRAUD IN THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN CHURCH COMMUNITY

According to the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA) affinity fraud is one of the ten most common
financial scams in the United States.2 ° Unfortunately, the recent rise in
discretionary income 2 1 among African Americans has been met with
little increase in investment education and financial knowledge among
African Americans. 22 Coupled with the recent push among African
American churches to give other African American businesses "trust
23
and support," African American investors are ripe for defrauding.
What could be viewed as a positive growth among African American
communities-the ability to invest disposable income-has been
transformed into a means through which African American scam
artists prey on their own community. 24
Church-based affinity fraud poses major problems for
securities regulators. 25 Victims are reluctant to inform investigators
19. See Fairfax, supra note 3. See generally Mark Gergen, The Case for a Charitable
ContributionsDeduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1395. (1988) (indicating tax deductions serve
as reward for selfless behavior); Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 YALE
L.J. 835, 843 (1980) (noting the importance of charitable giving to society as a whole).
20. See NASAA, supra note 2.
21. The Selig Center For Economic Growth at the University of Georgia forecasts that
the buying power of African American households in the United States will increase by a
compound annual rate of 6.1%. See Selig Center Report, supra note 15.
22.

See Jeanne Dugan, Broken Trust: A Young Man's Talk of Stock Riches Lures Host of

'RegularFolks, 'WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2000, at Al, availableat 2000 WL-WSJ 26609357.
23.

See id.

24. See id.
25.

See Pennsylvania Sec. Comm'n, Affinity Fraud,at

http://www.psc.state.pa.us/investor/ibulletin/affinity.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2005). No
particular religious group is immune from being targeted. See id. (noting "Religious affinity
fraud remains a widespread problem, with swindlers found across all denominations").
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that they have been scammed out of embarrassment, a belief in
"Christian forgiveness, ' ' 6 and, because religious groups tend to be
closely-knit, a victim may not want to prosecute someone they know
from their own church.2 7 If a victim reports the scam in her or his
church, she or he often believes government prosecution of the
perpetrator is inevitable. Reporting the crime precludes the perpetrator
from having a "change of heart" and returning the money to "repent"
for stealing from the church. 2 8 Often times, victims in churches flatout refuse to believe a member of their own congregation would steal
from them.29
Moreover, victims are sometimes misled into thinking that the
government may be persecuting them for their religious beliefs30 or
their race, and that reporting the fraud to law enforcement will prohibit
any possible return on their investment, even after scam artists have
already stolen their money. 31 There is a sense of distrust towards a
majority government seizing and prosecuting minorities and, in the
eyes of some African American congregations, prosecuting a
perpetrator of affinity fraud whom they believe is innocent is another
the little wealth
example of the United States government controlling
32
and power held in African American communities.
In addition, church members frequently reach out to other
members of the church to solve the problems within the group, rather
than notify outsiders like securities regulators. 33 The end result is that
church-based affinity fraud, like other forms of affinity fraud, often
This type of intra-group loyalty is especially
goes unreported.

26. Interview with Lucy A. Cardwell, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland,
Division of Securities, in Baltimore, Md. (Aug. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Cardwell Interview].
Ms. Cardwell noted that often times ministers themselves are defrauded in these scams, and
their desire to forgive the perpetrators often prevents these ministers from testifying against
perpetrators.
27. See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 66.
28.
29.
30.

See
See
See
TAMPA TRIB.,

Cardwell Interview, supra note 26.
id.
Michael Fetcher & Morris Kennedy, Ministries Program Pitched Scripture,

Mar. 14, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 4647199 (noting that an implied
government persecution of religious or ethnic groups has been a unifying theme in these
scams).
31.
32.
33.
Comm'n,

See id.
See Cardwell Interview, supra note 26. See also Fairfax, supra note 3.
See W. Mark Sendrow, Affinity Fraud: The Ultimate Confidence Game, Ariz. Corp.
Sec. Div., at http://64.233.179.104 (last visited July 15, 2004).
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persons of color, and con artists use this to their
prevalent among
34
advantage.
Defrauding investors in a church-based setting is a particularly
effective scheme because con artists tend to reach large groups of
people when touting fraudulent investments to an entire congregation;
a large number of potential victims leads to the result that more money
can be stolen. 35 Networks of church communities are also frequently
exploited. In the case of the scheme in Arizona which defrauded
Baptists of $530 million, 36 perpetrators individually touted their
investment scheme to members of their own churches, and then sent
materials to other Baptist churches in the area, exploiting the network
37 In a similar
of individuals belonging to the Baptist community.
3 8 was effectuated by utilizing
fashion, an investment scheme in Florida
church mailing lists to target other individuals who belonged to other
churches of the same denomination.3 9 Most recently, in Alabama,
Abraham Kennard was convicted of using a network of African
4°
American preachers to defraud investors of almost $9 million.

III. THE CASE OF FINANCIAL WARFARE, INC.
The Financial Warfare Club 4 1 sold securities primarily at
African American churches from September 2000 through September
"through
church members
2001, targeting
,, 42 the exploitation of their
.
.
. ...
The presentations were
religious faith and their ethnic pride.
frequently advertised during church services on the immediately

34. See id.
35. See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 73.
36. See id. at 79.
37. See id. at 77.
38. See id. at 74.
39. See id. at 78.
40. See Ga. PreacherFound Guilty in Church Scam, WASH. POST, Feb. 8 2005, at A24,
available at 2005 WL 56299307.

41.

According to the group, the name "Financial Warfare" originates from Judges 6-8.

In their words "300 people were flooded with the wealth of 135,000-that's what happens

when you answer the call" and invest with their group." Judges 6 - 8 tells the story of Gideon
and his defeat of the Midianites. See id.
42. See Complaint, SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, et al., Civil Action No. 02-7156 (E.D.
Pa. filed Sept. 5, 2002) at 38, availableat
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complrI 7714.htm (last visited Dec, 15, 2004). As of

the publication of this article, the action filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, is stayed until May 2, 2005.
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preceding Sunday.43 In these presentations, Marcus Dukes and
Theresa Hodge, two of the principal players in the Financial Warfare
scam, were introduced to the congregation as successful African
American businesspeople who had a strong desire to "give something
back to the community" through their assistance to African American
churches. 4 Their presentations were replete with prayers, scriptural
references, and other religious language.45 At these presentations,
Dukes and Hodge informed congregants that, first, the essential
element to acquiring wealth was to invest in companies before their
initial public offering (I.P.O.) and, second, that African Americans
could not take advantage of these investments because the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 46 required the
purchase of shares before an I.P.O. be made by accredited investors,
47
such as persons who earn in excess of $200,000 a year.
In March of 2001, the Securities Commissioner of the State of
Maryland issued a Summary Order to Cease and Desist and later, in
May 2002, arranged for a settlement by consent against Dukes and
Hodge.48 The federal case, filed by the SEC, is currently pending
before a judge in the District Court of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. 9 The SEC alleges the total damage incurred by
Financial Warfare includes over 1,000 investors in at least eighteen
50
states of more than $1.3 million.
43. See id.
44. See id.at 43.
45. See id.
46. The SEC was granted authority by Congress in 1934 to regulate the securities
markets through several basic powers: rule-making, adjudication, and investigation, and
enforcement. See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.4
(4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter HAZEN: SECURITIES REGULATION].
47. See Complaint, SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, et al., Civil Action No. 02-7156 (E.D.
Pa. filed Sept. 5, 2002) at 39, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17714.htm (last visited Dec, 15, 2004).
48. See Maryland Attorney General, Church-BasedInvestment Program and Promoters
Permanently Enjoined from Securities and Investment Advisor Activities, (describing the
injunction against Dukes and Hodge), at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/2002/051502.htm
(last visited December 1, 2004). The Maryland Attorney General's complaint notes that
Financial Warfare gave presentations in approximately 65 to 80 churches in at least ten states.
See In re: Fin. Warfare Club Inc., et al., No. OAH-SD-51-200100002 (Md. 2002). However,
the SEC has alleged that approximately 1,000 investors in eighteen states had been defrauded
of approximately 1.3 million. See Complaint, SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, et al., Civil Action
No. 02-7156 (E.D. Pa. filed September 5, 2002) at 1, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17714.htm (last visited December 15, 2004).
49. See Complaint, SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, Inc., et al, No. 02-7156 at 1. See also
supra note 42 (indicating the case is currently stayed until May, 2005).
50. Seeid. at 38.
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The source of much of the firsthand knowledge and
observation which follows comes from a videotaped presentation
The videotape provides a vivid
given by Dukes and Hodge.
illustration of the means through which Financial Warfare touted
fraudulent investments at an African American church in Maryland. It
further demonstrates some of the means by which scam artists use race
and religion to defraud minority congregants and possibly even church
leaders.
A. The Scheme
Dukes and Hodge organized Financial Warfare, Inc. into
several corporations in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and
52
Nevada. They found prospective investors through presentations at
small churches and through meetings they arranged with pastors at
those churches. 53 After establishing a connection with the local pastor,
Dukes and Hodge made in-church announcements that they would be
week's service. 54
presenting an investment program following the next
These presentations were focused around the sale of unregistered
securities as I.P.O.s, and were laden with Biblical references and
prayers.55
The material misrepresentations made by Financial Warfare as
alleged by the SEC are staggering. At these presentations, Dukes and
Hodge guaranteed Financial Warfare would capture 5% of the
minority population in the next five years and create a whopping $1.25
billion for investors over nine months. 56 Financial Warfare offered
three levels of participation depending on investment and promised to
51. See supra note 18. The scheme used by Financial Warfare is hardly new.
Perpetrators often claim that their funds will be used to help do "God's work" in the
See Bill
community as well as help the church in its various projects and charities.
Broadway, Fraud 'in the Name of God'; Religion-Based Investment Scams Are Increasing,
Regulators Warn Scams Luring More Investors, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2001, at B9, available

at 2001 WL 30328306. Financial Warfare's website also combined biblical references and
investment advice. See In re: Fin. Warfare Club Inc., et al., No. OAH-SD-51-200100002
(Md. 2002) at 6.
52. See Complaint, SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, et al., Civil Action No. 02-7156 at 2.
These satellite offices allowed them to continue business by offering securities based in their
District of Columbia office even after the Maryland Attorney General won an injunction
against them.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 3.
56. See id. at u6.
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distribute ownership interests in three infrastructure companies which
did not exist except on paper, even though material distributed at the
seminars made it seem as if these companies were already operating. 17
The first of these phantom companies was described as a media
conglomerate which would acquire media outlets within the top fifty
minority markets over the next two years. The second company
allegedly would provide access to capital for minorities and operate its
own investment bank, commercial bank, and insurance company. The
third was a marketing agency, allegedly operating in thirty-five
locations with 2,500 affiliated church businesses. 58 Financial Warfare
promised their audience that these companies would soon go public.5 9
The tactics used by Hodge and Dukes were extremely
effective; as noted earlier, approximately 1,000 investors in eighteen
states had been defrauded of more than $1.3 million. 60 Investors'
money was not used to purchase stock or benefit members of the
Financial Warfare Club in any way. Instead, the SEC alleges,
approximately $300,000 went to salary and benefits for Dukes and
Hodge, another $300,000 went to "consulting services" they
performed, and approximately $600,000 was lost in "intercompany
transfers" consisting of about $42,000 in payments to luxury hotels
61
and more than $92,000 in cash withdrawals.
B. The Players
Two of the four individuals who participated in the
presentation the church are named in the Maryland Attorney General's
complaint against Financial Warfare. 62 Marcus Dukes and Teresa
Hodge provided the investment information behind the scam.
Although Dukes and Hodge had presented themselves as financially
successful, Hodge had a particularly difficult time with her own
personal finances; she had filed for bankruptcy four times between
1996 and 1999.63 Dukes had a background as a registered sales

57.
58.

See Complaint, SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, et al., Civil Action No. 02-7156 at 9.
See id. at 7.

59.

See id.

60. See id. at

1.

61. Seeid. at 4.
62. See generally In re: Fin. Warfare Club Inc., et al., No. OAH-SD-51-200100002
(Md. 2002) (naming Teresa Hodge and Marcus Dukes as defendants).
63. See Complaint, SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, et al., Civil Action No. 02-7156 (E.D.
Pa. filed Sept. 5, 2002) at 4, available at
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representative for a securities company, but in 1994 was censured,
fined $25,000, and permanently barred from working for any broker
dealer for engaging in trading in a customer's brokerage account.
None of this was disclosed to their potential victims.
The pastor of the church at which Dukes and Hodge gave their
presentation was not named in the Maryland Securities
Commissioner's complaint or in the SEC complaint, but appears in the
videotape of Financial Warfare's presentation. Likewise, a visiting
minister also appears on the tape; he arguably played a role in
enhancing Financial Warfare's credibility by testifying to the strong
spiritual foundation and profound financial knowledge of Dukes and
Hodge. 64

C. The Pitch
1. Appeal to a HigherAuthority Through Scripture- or, "God
is Sanctioningthe Scheme"
At Financial Warfare's pitch to the congregation, the pastor of
the church opened the presentation with a prayer. He explained
"wealth is not a dirty word" and there is no Biblical foundation for
treating wealth as an evil.65 It was his belief that the world of finance
was the "spiritual niche" of the representatives of Financial Warfare,
and they were committed to helping bridge the gap between the
spiritual and financial world.
The visiting minister then addressed the church leaders. He
claimed that when he first met Dukes and Hodge, he was not able to
afford to build a church for his congregation, but, after "aligning" with
77
14.htm (last visited Dec, 15, 2004). Three
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complrl
petitions were dismissed; a court granted relief to one petition filed in 1997.
64. Neither the church's pastor nor the visiting minister were named in any complaint,
either by the Maryland Securities Commissioner or the SEC. However, both appear on the
videotape on which I base this summary. See Financial Warfare Videotape, supra note 18.
Therefore, my interpretation of any role they may have played in the scam is purely
speculative.
65. Cf Luke 18:22-25.
"When Jesus heard this, he said to him, "There is still one more thing you
need to do. Sell all you have and give the money to the poor, and you will
have riches in heaven; then come and follow me." But when the man
heard this, he became very sad, because he was very rich. Jesus saw that
he was sad and said, "How hard it is for rich people to enter the Kingdom
of God! It is much harder for a rich person to enter the Kingdom of God
than for a camel to go through the eye of a needle."
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God, the two financial planners, and a series of corporations, he was
able to construct his church.6 6 His presentation was spun into a
masterful web of Bible references and misappropriated financial
terminology. For example, he claimed that King Solomon had stated
that money solves "everything." 67 He also informed the congregants in
attendance for the presentation that the representatives of Financial
Warfare will "tear down the old concepts of money in Christ" and will
"explain how the Body of Christ" fits into taking advantage
of
68
business opportunities.
Theresa Hodge, a well-dressed woman in her mid-thirties,
informed those in attendance that she left the business world at the
request of God to present Financial Warfare to churches, and was
sharing the "good news" as it relates to money. Quoting Deuteronomy
8:18,69 she claimed that, through the Bible, God is giving Christians
the power to acquire wealth. Hodge attempted to minimize the
possibility of risk in investing with Financial Warfare by asserting it
was not a "get rich quick scheme," 70 but rather a strategy "based on
wisdom" and one that was brought by God to the Financial Warfare
team. 7 1 Dukes also used this tactic in his pitch, stating that there was
66. The pastor quoted John 15:1-2: "I am the true vine, and my Father is the gardener.
He cuts off every branch in me that bears no fruit, while every branch that does bear fruit he
prunes so that it will be even more fruitful." Id.
67. I believe he is referring to 2 Chronicles 1:11-1:17, in which God grants Solomon
riches because he "has not asked riches, wealth or honour." Because of Solomon's humility,
God grants him wealth to build his kingdom and reign over Israel. Although he believes the
message to be derived from this passage is that "money solves everything," it was the fact that
Solomon had the ability to lead Israel because he had asked for "wisdom and knowledge for
thyself, that thou mayest judge my people, over whom I have made thee king." Id.
68. After scouring the New Testament, I was unable to find a section in which Jesus told
his disciples to take advantage of business opportunities. Cf Mark 1:14-1:18, in which Simon
Peter and Andrew abandoned their "business opportunity"--fishing-in order to follow Jesus:
Now after that John was put in prison, Jesus came into Galilee, preaching
the gospel of the kingdom of God, And saying, The time is fulfilled, and
the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe the gospel. Now as
he walked by the sea of Galilee, he saw Simon and Andrew his brother
casting a net into the sea: for they were fishers. And Jesus said unto them,
Come ye after me, and I will make you to become fishers of men. And
straightway they forsook their nets, and followed him.
Id.
69. "Remember that it is the Lord your God who gives you the power to become rich.
He does this because he is still faithful today to the covenant that he made with your
ancestors." Deuteronomy 8:18.
70. We will later see that it is, in fact, touted as a "get rich quick scheme."
71. As Dukes later explains, Morgan Stanley had offered to "write them a check for $7
million" which they refused, because they wanted to keep Financial Warfare away from the
"majority community." Cf, SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, Inc., et al, Civil Action
No.: 02-7156
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"nothing too hard for God," thus implying that God was in control of
the market and, consequently, Christians can profit through investing.
Investing with Financial Warfare was an "Act of Faith" and Dukes'
job on Earth is to act as God's facilitator.
Financial Warfare also used scripture in its marketing
materials. The brochure distributed at presentations explains the
program as the following:
Why join Financial Warfare Club? In 1999, the
combined value of the New York Stock Exchange and
NASDAQ markets were worth over 14.5 trillion
dollars. Proverbs 13:22 concludes, ". . . the wealth of
the sinner is laid up for the just." It is no secret where
the wealth is laid up. Deuteronomy 8:18 determines
that God has given us the "... power to get the wealth..
The prophetic "Wealth Transfer" is how this will
occur, but the transfer requires a vehicle to activate this
promise. Financial Warfare Club is such a vehicle.
The Financial Warfare Club is the way for you to
activate your power to get wealth.72
This appeal to scripture targeted congregants' sense of Christian
charity and, at the same time, gave the impression that God was
sanctioning the investment scheme touted by Dukes and Hodge. In
supporting financial misrepresentations with scripture, Financial
Warfare appealed to congregants in language familiar to the faithful.
The methods used by Financial Warfare are hardly new. The
use of scripture in a sales pitch to members of a church is a standard
method through which affinity fraud is perpetrated.74 The presence of
both the church's pastor and the visiting minister, as well as their
frequent use of scripture in the presentation helped create the illusion
(E.D. Pa.) at I 46(f) (Oct. 20, 2004) in which the SEC alleges, "Dukes falsely claimed that he
had met with a representative of Morgan Stanley about investing in Fin. Warfare Club and that
the representative offered Dukes $7 million 'on the spot.' In fact, Dukes never discussed
Financial Warfare Club with any representative of Morgan Stanley and the described events
never occurred." Id.
72.

See Financial Warfare, Marketing Materials Distributed to Potential Investors,

[hereinafter Financial Warfare Marketing Materials] (on file with author).
73. See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 92.
74. See Oracle Trust Fund, Lit. Rel. No. 16355, 71 SEC Docket 211 (Nov. 16, 1999),
available at http://sec.gov.litigation/litlelearses/lr16355.htm (in which perpetrators of this
scheme touted investments with biblical names).
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that not only the church, but God was sanctioning Financial Warfare's
plan.
2. Appeal to Race in a Religious Context
Hodge noted in her presentation that African Americans do not
get a chance to participate in Wall Street; at best, they "passively"
invest in mutual funds. She stated African Americans are merely
"feeding the system" 75 by purchasing products made by companies
owned by whites. According to their marketing materials, "The
American Black Church membership contributes 3 Trillion Dollars to
this system." 76 Hodge contrasted this treatment with the investment
strategy of Financial Warfare, which had the potential to fill the
pockets of the African American community because their investments
were made by other African Americans in African American owned
businesses. 77 Although it is true that there are few African American
owned businesses on Wall Street, 78 Hodge attributed this to fact that
African Americans are not considered "accredited investors., 79 Dukes
75. Although "the system" is never explicitly defined, Financial Warfare's marketing
materials claim that "This System Controls the Wealth of the Nations" and, from context, can
be explained as commerce created by the New York and NASDAQ stock exchanges. It was
Financial Warfare's contention that African Americans do not own stock, but purchase
commercial goods which profit majority-owned businesses. See Financial Warfare Marketing
Materials, supra note 72.
76. See id. "The system" refers to the number of shares traded on the New York and
NASDAQ exchanges. See id. Financial Warfare further breaks down African American
"contributions" to "the system," claiming that every African American spends an average of
$65,000 to benefit majority owned businesses, and a one-hundred member church contributes
approximately $6,500,000. See id.
77. The materials claim that all investors who participate in the Financial Warfare Club
are the "founders" of the Minority Economic Network, and each of the three companies under
Financial Warfare's umbrella organization "will be a critical piece to building a strong
network of new minority owned public companies." See id.
78. There are only three African American CEOs of Fortune 500 companies. See
FORTUNE, Most Powerful Black Executives, at http://www.fortune.com/fortune/blackpower.
79. Hodge uses this term to illustrate that the dearth of publicly traded African
American-owned businesses to the SEC regulations defining accreditation. These exemptions
indicate that under certain circumstances, the cost and burden of registration are not necessary
if investors have enough sophistication to make informed investment decisions without the
issuing company providing certain information to the SEC or exchanges. This is untrue.
Section 4(6) of the Securities Act's registration requirements, allowing sales to accredited
investors, is based on the general absence of advertising or public solicitation in the offering
process of I.P.O.s. See HAZEN: SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 45, at § 4.23. According
to 17 CFR § 230.501 (4)-(8), individuals can be accredited investors if they are:
(4) Any director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the
securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive officer, or
general partner of a general partner of that issuer; (5) Any natural person
whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at
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later affirmed Hodge's theory, and added that the church community
can have access to Wall Street only if it has access to I.P.Os. 80 Dukes
told congregants that individuals who purchase stock before an I.P.O.
are guaranteed to make money, noting that companies who went
public in 1999, averaged a 35% return on their investment and a 186%
return within the first year. 8 1 Likewise, Dukes also informed the
audience that African Americans generate $1.78 trillion for whites but
never reap the benefits of their own purchasing power.82 Dukes
warned against an ominous technology park coming to Baltimore, and
predicted that working-class African American families will be driven*
out of their homes due to the same increase in property values that
happened in Silicon Valley 83 if they could not compete on Wall Street.
In his presentation, Dukes appealed to the long history of
racism in the United States. He informed the audience that African
American investors are always denied loans by "majority banks" and,
if African Americans need money to build churches or otherwise
invest in their communities, they cannot go to African American
He
owned banks because these banks "have no money."
recommended church leaders must "buy black, own black, and take
the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000; (6) Any natural person who
had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most
recent years or joint income with that person's spouse in excess of
$300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation of
reaching the same income level in the current year; (7) Any trust, with
total assets in excess of $5,000,000, not formed for the specific purpose of
acquiring the securities offered, whose purchase is directed by a
sophisticated person as described in § 230.506(b)(2)(ii); and (8) Any
entity in which all of the equity owners are accredited investors.
See id.
Although many Americans, including African Americans, may not meet the requisite
income level to be considered "accredited," Hodge implied that this barrier of "accreditation"
is what excludes African Americans from investing to build wealth, indicating that
accreditation is used to prevent "poor people" from investing in general.
80. See SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, Inc., et al., Civil Action No.: 02-7156 (E.D. Pa.) at
39 (Oct. 20, 2004); see also Fin. Warfare Club Inc., et al., No. OAH-SD-51-200100002 (Md.
2002) at 8.
81. See Fin. Warfare Club Inc., et al., No. OAH-SD-51-200100002 (Md. 2002) at 8.
Financial Warfare's marketing materials explain that "$1,000 invested in Cisco Systems'
Initial Public Offering (IPO) [sic] in 1990 became $1,3000,000 in the year 2000." See
Financial Warfare Marketing Materials, supra note 72.
82. See Selig Center Report, supra note 18, at 2. The report indicates that African
American buying power is currently at $688 billion. See id. at 3.
83. Property values in Silicon Valley, California, grew to almost prohibitively expensive
levels during the I.P.O. boom in the late 1990s. See generally What It Takes to Come Top in
Technology, ECONOMIST, April 2, 1997, at S7 (outlining the rapid increase in real estate prices
in Silicon Valley, California, during the late 1990s).
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black back to Wall Street." All businesses which are part of Financial
Warfare's financial strategy, he claimed, will be owned by African
Americans and Christian churches. The entire investment would be
84
"deliberately kept within the community."
Dukes' tactic tied a sense of racial allegiance with charitable
impulses. 85 Securities regulators have noted that individuals with any
income to invest also desire to help others generate such income, as
"members of other long-established minority groups who have
accumulated savings and achieved a certain standard of living through
years of hard work. Often they want to 'give back' to the community
in order to help others like themselves."
There is also a standing
tradition among African Americans to extend financial support to
African American charities and business. 87 This appeal to invest in
African American-owned businesses targets the charitable impulse to
return to the community.
In his presentation, the visiting minister spoke of the paradox
that "all churches face" because churches and congregants often
struggle to raise enough money to carry their message into the
community, they often have to "downsize their [ecclesiastical] vision,"
thus contradicting the mandate of evangelism.
He noted that
Christians are perceived as weak because God is unable to supply their
need, but asserted that by following the advice of Financial Warfare,
God will "demystify Wall Street" and afford Christians what they
need. 88 He also indicated that this investment vehicle was offered to
"some of the largest black churches," but Financial Warfare felt
having a few already wealthy churches participate would be like the
rich taking in more wealth. Securities regulators note that this is also a
84. This part of the scheme refers to the nonexistent investment bank Dukes and Hodge
touted, named Integrated Solutions International. See Fin. Warfare Club Inc., et al., No.
OAH-SD-51-200100002 (Md. 2002) at 7. Dukes and Hodge informed investors they had
created two operational infrastructure companies which would drive their business. The first
was GlobalCom InterNetworks, a self-described media convergence company which would
acquire television and radio stations within the top fifty minority markets over the next two
years. The second was Integrated Solutions International, which allegedly provided the access
to capital needed for growth through their own investment bank, commercial bank, and an
insurance company. Although Dukes and Hodge promised these companies would soon go
public, neither of these companies existed. See id.
85. See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 94.
86. See Oracle Trust Fund, Lit. Rel. No. 16355, 71 SEC Docket 211 (Nov. 16, 1999),
available at http://sec.gov.litivation/litlelearses /lr6355.htm.
87. See Dugan, supra note 22, at- Al. (quoting Patricia Turner, Professor of African
American Studies at the University of California at Davis).
88. See Financial Warfare Videotape, supra note 18.
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common tactic used by perpetrators of affinity fraud; as mentioned
above, African Americans often harbor distrust towards the
government, based on the theory that a majority government is
intentionally prosecuting the members of the church based on their
religious beliefs or ethnic background.89
Dukes and Hodge thus employed a two-fold method to abuse
90
religious affinity and defraud attendees at this meeting.
and
racial
First, by appealing to race in a religious context, the representatives of
Financial Warfare managed to abuse the charitable impulses of the
faithful and struggle of African Americans to gain economic parity
with whites. Second, by alleging a conspiracy theory against
individuals in the church, the speakers were able to draw a distinct line
between those "inside" and "outside" of the group.

IV. SECURITIES LAWS AS APPLIED IN FINANCIAL WARFARE

Current responses to affinity fraud are varied, and include an
educational effort by state and federal regulatory agencies to educate
Whether perpetrated
potential targets and target perpetrators. 9'
through the fraudulent purchase and sale of securities, a Ponzi scheme,
or garden-variety theft, affinity fraud is actionable though several legal
avenues. Although the latter part of this article addresses cultural and
social justifications for increased punishment for affinity fraud in
African American churches, there are several legal mechanisms
available to state and federal prosecutors through which perpetrators of
affinity fraud can be prosecuted. In this section, I explain how affinity
fraud is punishable under both state and federal securities statutes.

89. See Cardwell Interview, supra note 24; see also Fairfax, supra note 3, at 128
(discussing how perpetrators of religious-based affinity fraud have used the notion that the
government is persecuting them as a means of gaining loyalty). Perpetrators sometimes
convince group members that reporting the scheme will prevent victims from ever seeing
return on their investment. See id. at 129.
90. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
91. Numerous state and federal regulatory agencies have undertaken an effort to educate
investors about the threat of affinity fraud scams. See, e.g., supra note 12 (the SEC's warning
about the methods and signs of affinity fraud); Pa. Sec. Commission, Affinity Fraud, at
Securities
Pennsylvania
(the
http://www.psc.state.pa.us/investor/ibulletin/affinity.htm
Commission's description and warning about affinity fraud); N.Y. Office of the Att'y Gen.,
What is Affinity Fraud, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/investors/affinity.html (the New York

Attorney General's description and warning about affinity fraud).
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A. State SecuritiesLaws
Although criminal prosecution is available to both state 92,93 and
federal securities regulators, affinity fraud is typically prosecuted in
civil actions.94 State securities regulators govern the offer and sale of
securities in or from the state95 and also supervise the registration of
92. In Maryland, criminal prosecution of securities laws is codified at MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASSN'S §11-705.
93. State regulators played an active role in prosecuting Martha Stewart for fraud, which
has received a significant amount of public attention. In Maryland, the applicable statute is
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASSN'S § 11-301 (2004). The Maryland statute mandates:
[it is] unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer or sale of a
security (1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; (b) to
make any untrue statement of material fact or omit to a state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) to
engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit on any person.
Id.
In the case of Financial Warfare, the Maryland Attorney General alleged Hodge
"misrepresented or omitted to reveal material facts pertaining to the nature of the investment
and the risks associated with the investment in Hodge's companies" and "used investor funds
without any of the formalities of investment entities, transferring funds from one account to
another and from one company to Hodge personally, with the result that they engaged and
practices that operated as fraud on the investors. Respondents also used funds from one
investor to repay other investors, as in a Ponzi Scheme, and thus employed a device, scheme
or artifice to defraud" (citations omitted). See Fin. Warfare Club Inc., et al., No. OAH-SD51-200100002 (Md. 2002) at 8. See also supra note 11 (describing Ponzi schemes).
94. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASSN'S §11-701 (1)(b)(4) (2004) (permitting $5,000
per violation in fines or civil penalties). The 1996 National Securities Markets Improvement
Act resulted in the preemption of state securities laws by federal laws in many areas of
securities regulation, most notably registration and reporting requirements. See National
Securities Markets Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (104th Cong., 2d
Sess., 1996). State securities regulations are called blue-sky laws, which refers to the offer or
sale of non-publicly traded securities during the process through which private companies
register and are traded on pubic markets. Although the 1998 Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act requires that most lawsuits against publicly traded securities be traded in federal
courts, state agencies still prosecute violations of breach of contract, fraud, and breach of
fiduciary duty. In addition, state agencies are active in the essential function of registering
broker-dealers and investment advisers licensed to purchase and sell securities. See Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. Law. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat 3227 (105th Cong. 2d
Sess., Nov. 3 1998) (S 1260).
95. The Securities and Exchange Acts, as amended, presume that all securities must be
registered before their offer and sale. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e (2004) (detailing the registration
provisions of the Securities Act) and 15 U.S.C.A. 781(g) (2004). Types of securities which
generally do not require federal registration under these Acts are securities sold intrastate. See
15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(a)(1 1) (2004); for the exemptions listed in Section 3(b) of the Securities
Act, such as Regulation A, see 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(d)(6) (2004); for Rule 504, see 17 C.F.R.
§230.504 (2005); for Rule 505, see 17 C.F.R. §230.505 (2005). Regulation D refers to 17
C.F.R. 230.501-230.506 (2005), and transactions are made exempt under Section 4(2)'s
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broker-dealers 96 and investment advisers. 97 In a civil prosecution,
state agencies ordinarily hold perpetrators liable in three ways-by
prosecuting them for fraud,98 failure to register securities,99 or for
100
acting as a broker-dealer or investment advisor without registration.
In sum, state securities regulators ensure that securities offerings are
not carried out in a fraudulent manner.
To illustrate, the Maryland Securities Commissioner exercised
all three of these available avenues in her complaint against Financial
Warfare. First, the Commissioner argued that Dukes and Hodge
offered and sold membership interests in phantom corporations
through stock grants but failed to register these interests with the state;
this constituted a violation of the state law prohibiting the offer and
sale of securities without prior registration. 10 Second, Dukes and
Hodge failed to register with the state before they provided investment
advice and sold securities; this failure to register as investment
law. 10 2
advisers and broker-dealer agents is actionable under Maryland
Third, Dukes and Hodge either made untrue statements in their
marketing materials and presentations, or omitted material facts
necessary to make those statements not misleading under the
circumstances they were made.' 0 3 This constitutes securities fraud.
The Maryland Securities Commissioner detailed the fraudulent
misrepresentations in her complaint against Financial Warfare. First,
she argued the information offered by Financial Warfare contained a
laundry list of false and misleading information, omissions of material
fact, and material misstatements.' 0 4 For example, the advertising
material offered by Financial Warfare made it seem as if these
companies were operational, but none of the companies in which
Dukes and Hodge promised stock had an operating history, revenues,
nonpublic offering, see 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(d)(6) (2005). The appropriate Maryland statute

detailing exemptions is MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASSN'S § 11-401 (2004).
96. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996), commonly called the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act, narrows the authority of regulation of broker-dealers at
the state level, giving deference to the Federal Government. See supra note 92, and
accompanying text. However, state antifraud provisions are preserved. See id.
97. In Maryland, the relevant statute is MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASSN'S § 11-402
(2004).
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. §§ 11-301, -302.
id. § 11-501.
id. §§ 11-401, -402.
id. § 11-501.
id. § 11-401.
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASSN'S, §§ 11-301 -302 (2004).
Fin. Warfare Club Inc., et al., No. OAH-SD--51-200100002 (Md. 2002) at 8.
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contracts or employees. Marcus Dukes' "extensive experience" as a
stockbroker was also a lie; he had less than one year's experience as a
registered securities agent, and had previously been barred by the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 10 5 from acting as a
securities agent. Likewise, Financial Warfare, Inc. was not registered
as a broker-dealer or investment adviser with the state. In addition,
Ms. Hodge also failed to disclose that she had filed for personal
bankruptcy twice prior, and both Dukes and Hodge told investors they
personally contributed $1 million each to Financial Warfare, when
06
neither had contributed any money.'
B. FederalLaws
Federal securities law provides several avenues for securities
regulators to prosecute affinity fraud. The investments touted in an
affinity fraud scheme, such as the pre-I.P.O. interests sold by Dukes
and Hodge, often fall under the definition of a "security"' 1 7 and
therefore fall within the jurisdiction of federal securities laws. Unlike
state securities laws, which are most commonly used to provide civil
remedies, federal securities acts' 0 8 frequently seek both civil and
criminal penalties for violation of securities laws as defined by several
bodies of law.
The most frequently used are the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended ("Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended ("Exchange Act"), 10 9 which provide civil and criminal

105. The NASD is a self regulatory organization responsible for the oversight of brokerdealer regulation and is monitored by the SEC. See 15 U.S.C.A. 780-3 (2004).
106. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASSN'S §§ 11-301 -302 (2004), which makes it
unlawful to make untrue statements or omit material facts necessary to make a statement.
107. See supra note 11.
108. Although this body of law contains the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. 77(a) et
seq. (2004) (the "Securities Act"); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §78(a)
et seq. (2004), (the "Exchange Act"); The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1934, 15
USCA §§ 79 et seq. (2004); The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A. §77a et seq.
(2004); the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Investment Company Act"), 15 U.S.C.A. §80a
et seq. (2004), and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Investment Advisers Act"), 15
U.S.C.A. §80b-I et seq. (2004), for the purposes of this article, I have chosen to limit the
term "federal securities statutes" to the securities laws which apply most directly to cases of
affinity fraud. These are the Securities and Exchange Acts, the Investment Company Act, and
the Investment Advisers Act.
109. Both the Securities and Exchange Acts provide civil remedies for securities
violations. See infra, notes 107-164 and accompanying text.

2004]

Affinity Fraudin the African American Church

liability" 0 for the use of fraud or deception in the offer or sale of a
security."' The Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended
("Investment Company Act") and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, as amended ("Investment Advisers Act") also prohibit
fraudulent conduct by investment
companies and advisers, and are
12
relief."
for
avenues
further
As a result, the SEC can pursue various civil remedies. First, it
can seek an injunction requiring the perpetrators of fraud to cease and
desist,1 3 and can also require those perpetrators to disgorge any "illgotten gains."' " 4 The 1990 Securities Enforcement Remedies and
Penny Stock Reform Act' 15 provide injunctive 16 and disgorgement
power" 7 during administrative proceedings, as well as monetary
penalties." 8 Fines, in each19of these circumstances, vary according to
the severity of the offense.'
Each of these laws contains a provision which allows the
federal government to seek criminal prosecution for a willful violation
110. Although investment fraud results in civil penalties, this article is arguing for
increased punishment for scam artists under Federal Securities Laws, other federal criminal
statutes, breach of fiduciary duty, and hate crime legislation.
111. See 15 U.S.C.A. 77(a) et seq. (2004), see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(a) et seq. (2004).
112. See 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-7(a) (1994) (codifying aforementioned sections of the
Investment Company Act of 1940); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1)-(2) (1994) (codifying relevant
sections of the Investment Adviser Act of 1940).
113. See Securities Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1994); Exchange Act § 21(d), 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); Investment Company Act, § 9(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a9(f) (1994); Investment Advisers Act, § 203(k), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(k) (1994).
114. See ALAN R. PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION 367 (1998) ("Disgorgement of
defendants' ill-gotten gains to the U.S. Treasury is a frequent, and lucrative, remedy in SEC
injunction actions.") (citations omitted).
115. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act, Pub. L. No.
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C. (1994)).
116. This injunctive relief is in the form of a cease-and-desist order. This relief is similar
to the provisions of the Securities Act, § 8A, 15 U.S.C. §770)- (1994); the Exchange Act, §
21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1994); the Investment Company Act § 9(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(d)
(1994); and the Investment Advisers Act, §203(I), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-31 (1994 & Supp. V.
1999).
117. The disgorgement relief is similar to the Securities Act § 8A(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77hl(e) (1994); the Exchange Act § 21C(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(3) (1994); Investment Company
Act § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(e) (1994); and the Investment Advisers Act § 203(j), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(j) (1994).
118. These provisions are similar to those of the Securities Act § 20(d), 15 U.S.C. §
77t(d) (1994); the Exchange Act § 21 C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1994); the Investment Company
Act § 9(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(d) (1994); and the Investment Advisers Act § 203(I), 15 U.S.C.
80b-311) (1994 Supp. V. 1999).
119. Securities Act § 20(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d) (1994); Exchange Act § 21(d)(3), 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (1994); Investment Company Act § 9(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(d) (1994);
Investment Advisers Act § 203(I), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(I) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
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of the Act's provisions, 20 the prosecution of which is handled by the
United States Department of Justice. 12 1 The government has looked
not only to available provisions under these securities-specific laws,
but also to other federal laws to increase the sentencing for criminal
violations of affinity fraud. 122 The means through which the fraud is
committed-by a group action, by using various means of
communication, by committing the act via interstate activities, or by
concealing the activity-give rise to a host of crimes beyond the
Charges of
purview of the Securities and Exchange Acts.
123
conspiracy,
the prohibition against making false statements under
oath to a government agency (such as the SEC), 124 mail and wire
fraud, 12 5 perjury, 126 obstruction of justice, 127 RICO, 12 8 and money
120. See Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1994); Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. §
78ff(a) (1994).
121. See 28 U.S.C. 515(a) (1994) (granting the Justice Department authority to conduct
criminal proceedings).
122. Some prosecutors have looked for increased criminal punishments for affinity fraud.
See United States v. Castellanos, 81 F.3d 108, 112 (9th Cir. 1996) (which did not apply the
"vulnerable victim" enhancement to a Hispanic man who lured Hispanic investors to work
with him by claiming his company was "proudly Hispanic"). But see United States v. Omori,
194 F.3d 18, unpublished table decision, 1996 WL 726647, at **4 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding
the same "vulnerable victim" enhancement for a Japanese-American bank manager who
convinced her Japanese customers to purchase fraudulent certificates of deposits). See
generally United States v. Medrano, 241 F. 3d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding sentencing
enhancements for a Hispanic bank teller found guilty of embezzlement from Spanish-speaking
customers). Recently, in United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), the Supreme Court
determined the elements of the Federal Sentencing guidelines which require a judge to
enhance a defendant's sentence based on judicial fact-finding violate the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court heard Booker's case with that of Douglas
Fanfan; this section of the opinion analyzed two sections of the guidelines; one rendered
certain sentencing enhancements mandatory, and the second established standards for review
for sentences which were appealed. The general effect of these two decisions was that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines were advisory and not mandatory. At the time of press,
District courts are still determining the application of these two cases.
123. See United States v. Sprecher, 783 F.Supp. 783 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), in
which the court noted that the salient characteristic of conspiracy crimes is any agreement to
commit an unlawful act; there does not need to be any formalized arrangement to commit a
conspiracy. See U.S. v. Rubin, 844 F.2d 979 (2d. Cir 1988); U.S. v. Middlebrooks, 618 F.2d
273 (5th Cir. 1980). Two persons are required to carry out a conspiracy. See Rogers v. U.S.
340 U.S. 367 (1951). In addition, at least one of the conspirators must take a step in
furtherance of the conspiracy. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
124. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (1994). The "false statements statute" applies to making
false statements under oath to a government agency. See U.S. v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503
(holding that the false statements statute was created to allow government agencies to perform
their duties to the best of their ability).
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. 1343 (1994) (wire fraud). Mail
and wire fraud are predicate offenses to establish a RICO count, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961 and
infra note 125, and constitute a "specified unlawful activity" under federal money-laundering
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by any of
laundering 29 often come into play. A criminal prosecution
0
these avenues can result in fines, imprisonment, or both.13
1. Prosecution Under the Securities Act
The Securities Act was implemented to promote "full and fair
disclosure" of information regarding securities sold to the general
public. 13 As mandated by Section 5, no security may be sold without
registration unless the security falls under an exemption defined in the
Act. Criminal prosecution for securities violations transpire under two
statutes, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 and infra note 126. The activities covered by mail and
wire fraud include a plan to intentionally deceive a party in conjunction with the mail or
interstate commerce. Unlike Rule 10b-5, which finds liability for "any scheme or artifice to
defraud," the crimes of mail and wire fraud do not need to the alleged fraud to have anything
to do with the purchase or sale of securities. The purpose of mail and wire fraud statutes is to
punish the scheme, rather than whether or not this scheme was carried out. See generally
U.S. v. Sanders, 893 F. 2d 133 (7th Cir. 1990). Both are "specific intent" crimes, meaning
that the government must prove that "the defendant knowingly did and act which the law,
forbids... purposely intending to violate the law." See DEVITT AND BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS (3d ed.) § 14.03. Each separate mailing or communication, even if

committed with respect to a single scheme to defraud can receive separate and consecutive
sentences. See Badders v. U.S. 240 U.S. 391 (1916) (holding consecutive sentences for
several counts of mail or wire fraud does not violate the double jeopardy clause).
126. In the context of securities and investment fraud, all affidavits and sworn statements
made to the SEC or other government agencies are subject to charges of perjury.
127. The United States criminal code contains seventeen sections relating to the
obstruction of justice. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1517. The text of the statute forbids anyone
who "endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit jury or officer in or of
Obstruction of justice can be satisfied
any court of the United States." See id. § 1503.
almost regardless of whether the defendant is aware he is committing this crime. See U.S. v.
Jeter, 775 2d. 670 (6th Cir. 1985).
128. Individual RICO violations carry a twenty-year maximum term of imprisonment,
plus a fine of not more than the greater of $250,000 for an individual or $500,000 for an
organizational defendant. The RICO statute can be found at Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX,
When a
§901(a), 84 Stat. 841 (Oct. 15, 1970), as amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
defendant when convicted must surrender all property or interest acquired through the RICO
violation. RICO violations have frequently been used in securities crimes cases, and has been
construed broadly to not only cover traditional "organized crime" but also cases of securities
fraud. See generally U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); Russello v. U.S. 464 U.S. 16
(1983). It is important to note that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
amended RICO, thus limiting the extent to which federal law enforcement can rely on conduct
that constituted securities fraud as a basis for a civil RICO violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994
& Supp. V. 1999).
129. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957. Courts have interpreted these statutes as also relating
to "financial institutions" as defined in Title 31, U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2). See U.S. v. Gollott, 939
F. 2d 255 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a group of people who launder money are considered a
"financial institution").
130. See Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1994); Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. §
78ff(a) (1994).
13 1. Securities Act, Preamble.
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132
symbiotic provisions of the Act. Section 5's registration provisions
mandate that securities must be first registered with the SEC 133 before
they are sold to the public, or be otherwise exempt under provisions of
the Act. 134 This section also contains a prohibition against acts of
fraud in the sale of securities;' 35 antifraud provisions are detailed in
Sections 11, 12, and 17136 of the Act. Section 5 works by itself for
civil remedies, or in conjunction with Section 24, which allows for the
criminal prosecution 137 of any willful violation of the provisions of the
Securities Act.
As demonstrated in the case of Financial Warfare, Dukes and
Hodge did not file any registration statement with state agencies or the
SEC in connection with the offer and sale of the securities they sold in
their presentations. Moreover, because these securities were sold in
multiple states, the SEC also alleged a violation of Rule 17(a) 38 in

132. The registration process requires full disclosure of all material facts.
133. Violating the Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994) involves (1) a person
selling a security "through the mails" or by another means of interstate commerce (2) the
security is being sold to sell or to be delivered after a sale (3) there is no valid effective
registration statement and (4) the seller acted "willfully." The "willfulness" requirement was
established in U.S. v. Wiender, 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1978), and the Supreme Court has
defined it as "a word of many meanings, its construction often being influenced by its
context," but bears the requirement that there is a "bad faith or evil intent" element to the
offense. See Spies v. U.S., 317 U.S. 492 (1943), citing U.S. v. Murdock 290 U.S. 389 (1933)).
134. Rule 501 of Regulation D exempts accredited investors, which are statutorily
defined by their level of net worth and investment sophistication. See supra note 93.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
136. Section 17 makes it unlawful:
To obtain money or property by means of an untrue statement of material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading or
To engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a purchaser.
Securities Act § 17(a)(2-3), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2-3) (1994). A willful violation of Section 17
is a criminal offense. See Aaron v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 446 U.S. 680 (1980),
in which the Supreme Court held that scienter is a requirement to find a party liable for a
violation of Section 17; the "willful violation" requirement of the antifraud provision
contained in 17(a) is frequently litigated. Under this part of the statute, it is illegal to engage
in fraud when selling securities, regardless of whether those securities were required to be
registered. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c) includes all securities whether or not those securities were
required to be registered. See United States v. Wheeler, CR-S-92-228 (LDG RLH), SEC
Today 110 (May 21, 1993), in which a defendant was found guilty of a Section 17(a) violation
for fabricating information on a Form S-18 with the SEC.
137. Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1994).
138. See SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, Inc., et al., No. 02-7156
59, 63, 67, 71 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 20, 2004). See also supra note 136 (detailing the provisions of Section 17).
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their complaint, which forbids the use of fraud in the intrastate offer or
sale of securities.
2. Prosecution Under the Exchange Act
Several provisions of the Exchange Act impose prohibitions on
fraudulent or deceitful conduct. Sections 9 and 10139 prohibit several
fraudulent activities, whereas Rule 1Ob-5 provides a general antifraud
provision.14 Rule lOb-5 applies to fraud "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of any securities.1 4 1 Like Section 24 of the Securities
criminal liability for willful violations of
Act, Section 32(a)jprovides
42
the Exchange Act.1

Of all of the provisions of the Exchange Act, Rule lOb-514 3 is
arguably the most popular avenue through which securities fraud is
prosecuted. Rule 1Ob-5 imposes a broader standard than the Section
139. See Securities Act of 1934 §§ 9, 10(a-b),15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j(a-b) (1994).
140. Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994) also prohibits fraudulent conduct
in tender offers.
141. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2004) operates in a similar manner as the Securities Act §
17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994), but is much broader. The 1933 Act only applies to the sale
of Securities, and adds "in connection with" instead of simply "in." See Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp, 298 F. Supp 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
142. Section 32(a) provides:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this title.. .or any rule
or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the
observance of which is required under the terms of this title, or any
person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be made, any
statement in any application, report, or document required to be filed
under this title or any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking
contained in a registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of
section 15 of this title [15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)], or by any self-regulatory
organization in connection with an application for membership or
participation therein or to become associated with a member thereof,
which statement was false or misleading with respect to any material fact,
shall be upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000 or imprisoned
not more than 20 years, or botch, except that when such person is a person
other than a natural person, a fine not exceeding $25000,000 may be
imposed; but no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section
for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no
knowledge of such rule or regulation.
Securities Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1994).
143. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004). Rule lOb-5 makes it illegal to
use or employ in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
See Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1994).
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17 of the Securities Act 144 by finding liability for any misleading
statement made "in connection" with the purchase or sale of securities.
In addition, Rule 10b-5 applies to all securities transactions, whereas
Rule 17(a) only applies to misrepresentations made in the offer and
sale of a security. Rule lOb-5, therefore, can be used to prosecute
misrepresentations and omissions and imposes a requirement of
45
scienter. 1
One critical difference between criminal liability imposed by
the two acts is that Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act (unlike Section
24 of the Securities Act) imposes a scienter requirement when
charging an individual with, making a materially false or misleading
statement in a report, document, filing, registration statement, or
application; 146 in fact, the final sentence of the regulation allows a
defendant to be exonerated if she had no knowledge of the violation. 147
The Exchange Act therefore makes proving fraud more difficult
because of this knowledge requirement.
In its complaint against Financial Warfare, the SEC alleged
that the securities and promissory notes offered by Dukes, Hodge, and
Financial Warfare in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Nevada
were sold in violation of Section 17(a), Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
of the Exchange Act. 148 The "securities" offered were interests in
144. See supra note 124.
145. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfielder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See also U.S. v. DeSantis,
134 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the government must prove that the defendant first
knowingly had a specific intent to defraud, second, that the misrepresentation or omission was
made to induce the other party to perform an act they otherwise would not have performed).
146. Some courts have interpreted this literally. For example, in United States v. Dixon,
536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir., 1976), the Court of Appeals indicated a "willful and knowing"
standard was appropriate,,and the lower court had erred in merging the "willful" standard into
a "willful and knowing" standard. The Dixon court articulated that the trial judge erred when
giving the jury instructions to apply the "willful" and not the "willful and knowing" standard.
Id. at 1396. In contrast, the Court in U.S. v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 934 (1976), held that the defendant acted with deliberate and reckless indifference to
the truth or falsity and, therefore, although he lacked the requisite "knowledge" under Section
32, was still liable.
147. The last sentence of Rule 32(a) provides "no person shall be subject to
imprisonment under this section for the violation of any of the rule or regulation if he proves
that he has no knowledge of such rule or regulation." Securities Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. §
78ff(a) (1994).
148. SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, Inc., et al., No. 02-7156
60-77 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20,
2004) states:
From at least September 2000 and continuing at least through March 2001,
defendants Dukes, Hodge, and FWC (MD) knowingly or recklessly, in
connection with the offer, purchase or sale of securities, directly and
indirectly, by the use of the means or instruments of transportation or
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phantom corporations to be sold pre-I.P.O.; according to Dukes and
Hodge, these corporations were solely owned and operated by African
Americans. The SEC also alleged that Dukes and Hodge sold these
securities to investors by telling them they would provide free shares
of these companies, or the chance to buy shares at a small cost, to
members of the Financial Warfare Club. 49 They promised that these
nonexistent companies would go public within five to eleven
months. 150 The reality is that no member of the club was ever given
the chance to buy stock, and there were no steps taken to take these
companies public. In addition, none of the financial literacy courses
offered by Dukes and Hodge were ever given, nor was money set aside
151
for their actualization.
3. Prosecution Under the Investment Company and Investment
Advisers Acts
The Investment Company Act requires that all investment
companies with assets over $100,000 who use the mails or interstate
commerce or who purport to be investment companies must register
with the SEC. 152 Although there are numerous provisions similar to
the Securities and Exchange Acts, the Investment Company Act
imposes additional disclosure requirements, 153 and protects against any
money managers' conflicts of interest.1 54 The 1970 Amendments to
this Act also prohibit fraudulent acts and practices in connection with
an investment company's portfolio securities. 155 Moreover, Section 49
communication in interstate commerce, or the means or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of the facilities of a national
securities exchange: (a) employed devices, schemes or artifices to defraud;
(b) obtained money or property by means of, or made, untrue statements
of material facts, or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading; and (c) engaged in acts, transactions,
practices, or courses of business which operated as a fraud or deceit upon
offerees, purchasers and prospective purchasers of securities.
Id.
149. See id. at 1 42.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Investment Company Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 (1994).
153. See Investment Company Act § 8(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(5) (1994).
154. See HAZEN: SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 45 at § 20.1.
155. See the Investment Company Act § 17(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(c) (1994); see also
Investment Company Act, Lit. Rel. No. 19224 (stating the advisor and portfolio manager of a
tax-exempt money market fund violated the 1940 act when purchasing over $170 million of
securities unrelated to the financial mission of the money market fund).
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provides criminal liability for any violation of the Investment
Company Act.' 56 The Investment Company Act also specifically
states that larceny and embezzlement of a registered company's assets
is a federal crime, 157 as is the falsification of records, to file a false or
misleading statement of material facts, or to omit any information
which would render any report misleading as required under the
58
Act.1
The Investment Advisers Act extends liability to non-broker
dealers who are in the business of giving investment advice. 5 9 The
Act requires registration' 60 of all non-exempt investment advisers, and
prohibits material misrepresentations made in connection with
rendering investment advice. 16' Violations of the Act can result in an
adviser's registration being suspended or revoked, and, as is the case
with the above mentioned securities laws, criminal penalties. 62
Although civil violations are brought more frequently, criminal
violations of the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts
have been infrequent, perhaps due to the strong antifraud provisions of
the Securities and Exchange Acts.' 63 The Acts, taken together, may
provide an alternative venue for the prosecution of affinity fraud as the

156.

Section 49 states:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this title or of any rule,
regulation, or order hereunder, or any person who skillfully in any
registration statement, application, report, account, record or other
document filed or transmitted pursuant to this title or the keeping of which
is required pursuant to section 31(a) makes any untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state any material fact necessary in order to
present the statements made therein from being materially misleading in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, shall upon
conviction be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both; but no person shall be convicted under this section for
the violation of any rule, regulation, or order if he proves that he had no
actual knowledge of such rule, regulation or order.
Investment Company Act § 49, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48 (1994).
157. Investment Company Act § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1994).
158. Investment Company Act § 34, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-33 (1994).
159. Investment Company Act § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1994) et seq.
160. Investment Company Act § 203(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c) (1994).
161. Investment Company Act § 204, 15 U.S.C. 80b-4 (1994).
162. See United States v. Elliott, 62 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 1995) (determining an adviserclient relationship is not a prerequisite for determining investment adviser fraud).
163. See Matthews, CriminalProsecutions Under the Investment Company Act of 1940
and the Investment Advisers Act, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REv. 1257, 1262 (1972).
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of the Acts have shown broad
few cases finding violations
64
statutes.'
the
of
construction

V. FURTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INCREASED PUNISHMENT OF
AFFINITY FRAUD

Although these traditional securities laws provide an important
vehicle through which victims of affinity fraud may be able to find a
resolution, they do not take into account the vital role the church has
played in promoting the extra-religious interests of the African
American community since the time of slavery. In the section below, I
argue that the history of African American churches can provide a
further understanding of the role churches play in community
development and minority wealth-building, and thus provide further
justification for strict sentencing for perpetrators of affinity fraud. The
history of African American churches also provides insight into why
African American churches have proven to be such fertile ground for
affinity fraud scams.1 65 Second, I argue that the sense of trust between
minister and congregant is effectuated in a fiduciary duty, which is
breached when ministers introduce con artists into their church, or
participate in the fraud themselves. Third, I briefly explain the
argument advanced by scholars like Lisa Fairfax, who argues that
affinity fraud constitutes a hate crime. Although there are many
avenues for prosecutors to take in punishing perpetrators of affinity
fraud, the sections below explain that affinity fraud in the African
American church is not only a crime, but reflects many complex social
issues not addressed by lawmakers.
A. Historicaland Social Justificationsfor IncreasedPunishment
Historically, the church has functioned
nexus in African American communities. As an
chattel slavery in the United States, African
operated as not only houses of worship, but

as an integral social
organized reaction to
American churches
also provided social

164. See United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that a
general intent for liability and proof an illegal transaction has occurred are enough to find
liability); see also United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976), (in which a
defendant was found guilty of embezzlement as a specific intent crime).
165.

See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (describing why African Americans

are particularly vulnerable to affinity fraud).
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organizations designed for the betterment of the communities in which
they existed both before and after emancipation.
Racial segregation was a driving force in the development of
African American churches as social service organizations; from the
institution of slavery arose a sense of unity among congregations 166
and a political base for African Americans.' 67 This "nation within a
nation" integrated community life with religious life, and led to the
"dichotomy between church and religion" central to the organization
and community-based activities of African American churches. 168
Church was both a forum in which to worship and to "learn about
one's world."' 169 During the years before emancipation, the church
served as a massive social support network, assisting in family life and
social control;' 70 during the civil rights movement, the church played a
7
crucial role in the struggle for political equality.' '
Scholars C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya note that
kinship relations traditionally have provided "the only real safety net"
for African Americans, by providing a source of child care and the
possibility of borrowing or lending money in times of financial
crisis. 172 Lincoln and Mamiya note that these resources are indicative
of a "survival strategy" among African Americans. 73 A second
strategy, the "liberation perspective," emphasizes self-determination,
dignity of life, and a sense of pride in African American culture and
tradition. 74 The church, they argue, operates between these two
strategies in both the political and economic realm. 175 They note that
the African American church is the most economically independent
entity in the economic sector of African American America because it

166. See PETER J. PARIS, THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE BLACK CHURCHES 17-19 (Fortress
Press 1985).
167. See Michele M. SimmsParris, What Does it Mean to See a Black Church Burning?
Understandingthe Significance of ConstitutionalizingHate Speech, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 127,
133 (1998). See also PARIS, supra note 166, at 8.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id See also E: FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO CHURCH IN AMERICA 39-40
(Schocken Books 1963).
171. See generally C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1990).

172.
173.
174.
175.

Seeid. at 241.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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does not depend on white America to pay its pastors, build its
churches, or depend on white trustees to raise funds.16
The foundations of the African American self-help tradition go
back to attempts by slaves to help each other survive the "traumas and
terrors of the plantation system."' 177 These traditions of caring for one
another's children and the communal housing in which slaves lived
fostered a tradition of mutual aid in the African American community
from early America onward. These traditions of mutual aid were
formalized when slaves were converted to Christianity and
congregated in churches during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. 178 The African American church as an economic nexus has
its inception in the African American church as a "mutual aid
society," 179 which existed in the antebellum south to aid slaves escape
to the north. These societies eventually founded African American
became banks and savings and loans for African
churches and
i °
1
Americans.
African American churches have a history of contributing to
the economic well being of the communities they serve. During the
years immediately following the Civil War, African American leaders
urged African Americans to mimic the economic advancement of Jews
in Europe, and stressed the importance for economic and moral
development of the African American people. 181 The Freedman's
Savings and Trust Company, chartered in 1864, provided the first
major bank that held the savings of most of the new emancipated
African Americans. Its collapse in 1874 following a long economic
recession and poorly trained leadership, laid a historical foundation for
distrust of banks. 182 By 1908, fifty-five African American-owned
banks had been established' 83 and clergy played a prominent role in
their establishment. 84 Prominent African American church leaders at
the turn of the twentieth century, such as Daddy Grace and Father
176. See id. The authors note that this differs from African American universities, which
do, in fact, rely on the fundraising efforts of whites. Id.
177. See id. at 242.
178.

See id.

179.

See Robert L. Woodson, Race and Economic Opportunity, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1017,

1031 (1989).

180. See id.
181. See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 169, at 243; see generally W.E.B. Du Bois,
THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 1-9 (Bantam Classic 1989) (1903).
182. See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 169, at 245.
183. See id.

184.

See id. at 246.
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Divine,1 85 initiated massive economic development in African
American communities, and neighborhood ventures such as adoption
agencies and credit unions have endured to this day, each with
business models that reflect the unique needs of the African American
community which they serve.' 86 Such credit unions are modeled after
Baltimore's African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church Credit
Union in that they are capitalized by the congregation and serving
investors with typically little capital to save. The A.M.E.'s Credit
Union currently serves the community by providing investment
education on financial planning and budgeting, and offers mutual
1 87
funds.

African American churches are also important cogs in the
economic machinery of their communities. Groups such as the
Congress of National Black Churches (CNBC) have established
community-based economic development programs to train African
American businessmen to run their own businesses, and provide
funding through grants for their operations.188 In fact, a South
Carolina pastor routinely invites local African American businessmen
to the lectern each Sunday to discuss their businesses. 189 In addition,
Leaders Energizing Community Development, founded by members of
the AME Church, has established church-based credit unions across
America. The United House of Prayer for All People routinely
purchases inner city property adjacent to better neighborhoods to
foster community development. In Maryland, Baltimore United in
Leadership Development (BUILD) is an interdenominational group of
thirty two churches which operates as a consumer advocacy group for
the African American congregations they serve.
African American churches are still involved in the economic
development of their communities on a massive scale. For example,
the Concord Baptist Church, the largest African American church in
the United States, operated a nursing home, private school, clothing
185. See University of Virginia, Religious Movements Homepage Project, "Sweet Daddy
Grace and the United House of Prayerfor All People,at
http://religiousmovements.lib.virginia.edu/nrms/daddy-grace.html
(last visited Oct. 12,
2004). Daddy Grace and Father Divine were prominent African American ministers at the
turn of the century who acquired tremendous personal wealth. Id.
186. See Woodson, supra note 179, at 1031.
187. See id.
188. See Laurie Goodstein, From Pulpit, Pitches for the Material World: Some Black
Congregations are Using Church to Push Entrepreneurship, WASH. POST, December 26,

1996, at Al.
189. See id.
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bank, credit union, and employed two full-time social workers. The
Bethany Baptist Church in Brooklyn raised $1 million to open a soup
kitchen that employs 44 people and serves lunch and dinner every day.
The A.M.E. Church in Jamaica, Queens, has established a housing
corporation responsible for rehabilitating ten stores in the
neighborhood, a home care agency, a 300-unit $11 million facility for
housing 300 senior citizens, and a 480-student elementary school. 90
Bringing economic vitality to urban African American
populations has a vital role in achieving racial parity with whites in the
United States.' 91 A salient aspect of church-based enterprise in
African American communities is an element of working together to
share resources for a charitable purpose: the betterment of the
Today, African Americans
community in which they operate.
constitute over twenty million people and a current value of $10.2
billion.

193

The importance of the church in African American economic
development provides a social and historical basis for the profound
financial incentive for scam artists such as Financial Warfare to
defraud congregants in African American churches. Although one
may assume that individual churches will not see the effects of fraud
as greatly because of their tremendous wealth and presence in the
community, this does not take into account the majority of small
churches which do not have these tremendous assets' 9 but have large
congregations. The massive scale of the churches discussed above
serves to illustrate the tremendous role churches play in community
development in African American communities. The charity of these
institutions plays a central role in helping these communities survive
and exist, and fills in the gaps where government-assisted social
programs cannot.
The role of the African American church in American society,
as evidenced by its history, mandates increased punishment for
perpetrators of affinity fraud because it serves as evidence of the
essential secular role the church plays in African American
communities. African American churches have played and continue to
Increasing
play an integral role in community development.
190.
191.

See LINCOLN& MAMIYA, supra note 169, at 257.
See Timothy Sandfleur, Can You Get There Here? How the Law Still Threatens

King's Dream, 22 L. & INEQ. 1, 29 (2004).

192. See Woodson, supra note 179, at 1031.
193. See id.
194. LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 169, at 262.
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punishment for affinity fraud committed in African American churches
will protect the essential role undertaken by African American
churches in urban development.
Moreover, African American
churches have historically been involved with developing the wealth
of their individual congregants; securities regulators have a distinct
interest in protecting these potential victim-investors from further
fraud given the increase in disposable income among African
Americans in recent years.19 5
B. Ministers 'Liability for Breach of FiduciaryDuty and
ConstitutionalProtectionsof Freedom of Religion
196
Churches have become big businesses in the United States.
Although churches have owned property and generated wealth since
the middle ages, the complexity of doing business in the modem world
and the need for capital to achieve church goals has affected the role of
the church as a business in our society. Poorer, smaller churches see
the extensive wealth of larger churches and the tremendous flexibility
that wealth brings to their ministry' 97 and, naturally, want a piece of
the pie.
Generating such enormous wealth arises from institutional
investing, complex real estate transactions, and other activities for
which securities laws were designed to regulate.' 98 In these
195. See Selig Center Report, supra note 15.
196. See Betsy Schiffman, Holy - Real Estate, Forbes.com, available at
http://www.forbes.com/2002/12/06/cx-bsl1206home.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2004). This
article claims that the Boston Archdiocese of the Catholic Church will have no problems
paying out the $100 million sex abuse settlement resulting from the charges brought against it.
"According to a report in The Boston Herald last August, it has about $160 million worth of
income-producing commercial real estate and total property worth between $1.3 billion and
$1.4 billion. As of 2001 the diocese boasted 2.069 million members. According to the Center
for Applied Research in the Apostle (a national Catholic research center), each household puts
an average $438 every year into the collection plate, which could generate hundreds of
millions a year in total donations." Id.
197. See Financial Warfare Videotape, supra note 18, in which members of Financial
Warfare repeatedly indicated the benefits churches would incur by having wealthy
congregants who tithed. For example, they explained the amount of annual tithes one
parishioner would bring if she became a multi-millionaire by investing with Financial
Warfare.
198.
Congress

. .

. eschewed the idea of a merit approach, opting instead for a

system of full disclosure. The theory behind the federal regulatory
frameworks is that investors are adequately protected if all relevant
aspects of the securities being marketed are fully and fairly disclosed. The
reasoning is that full disclosure providers investors with sufficient
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circumstances, the church ceases to administer pastoral guidance and
assumes the role of financial adviser, corporation, and venture
capitalist. 199 With this complex role of clergy comes a need for
education and guidance for ministers of smaller churches who may not
have resources such as financial advisers to guide them in their
decisions. An education initiative may also help alleviate the threat of
affinity fraud. This section details the need for heightened punishment
specifically for pastors who commit fraud knowingly,2 0° given the
heightened trust between minister and congregant and the nonecclesiastical roles and responsibilities some ministers assume.
1. Liability of Clergyfor Breach of FiduciaryDuty
but
To date, clergy cannot be held liable for malpractice,
claims for breach of fiduciary duty have survived summary judgment,
and courts have made certain to differentiate the two claims. 2°2 Claims
opportunity to evaluate the merits of an investment and fend for it
themselves.
See HAZEN: SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 45, at § 1.2[3][A].
199. Cf Ryan G. Lee, Employing the Section 5 Enforcement Power to Guarantee
Religious Freedom in the State Courts, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 1025, 1027 (2002). In his article,
Lee criticizes "an increasingly secular society inclined to render all things relative no longer
recognizes a meaningful distinction between the affairs of the church and the affairs of other
civilly liable organizations," and believes this demonstrates a "disturbing erosion" of tenets of
the First Amendment. Id. The author proposes that the federal judiciary enjoin state courts
from allowing churches to be sued in tort through Section Five of the First Amendment. See
id. at 1029.
200. See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 67-68 (2001). See also Mark Gergen, The Case For a
Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1395 (1988); Henry Hansmann,
The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 843 (1980).
201. To date, no court has recognized clergy malpractice as a cognizable cause of action.
See Nally v. Grace Community Church, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988), in which the parents of a
congregation member brought an action against the church after their son had been counseled
by a minister and later committed suicide. Courts have either found the tort does not exist,
see, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), or that even if the tort
existed, there was insufficient evidence to show that it had been committed, see, e.g., Hester v.
Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). Clergy malpractice is not recognized in
Maryland. See Borchers v. Hrychuk, 126 Md. App. 10, 727 A.2d 388 (1999).
202. See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287 (Colo. 1988), in which the court
articulated the difference between clergy malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty is that "the
former is a breach of trust and does not require a professional relationship or professional
standard of care, while the latter is an action of negligence based upon a professional
relationship and a professional standard of care." See Teadt v. Lutheran Church Missouri
Synod, 602 N.W.2d 816 (1999), which distinguishes between clergy malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty. In Teadt, a minister made sexual advances to a parishioner in the context of
pastoral counseling. The court held the claim was based on clergy malpractice, and a breach
of fiduciary duty in this context would be impossible to define because it is impossible to
prove that a minister violated a fiduciary duty by failing to provide for the congregant
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of clergy malpractice have generally failed on the grounds that
malpractice assumes a professional relationship between clergy and
congregant, and imposes a professional standard of care on clergy,
which is an impermissible violation of the First Amendment.2 °3
Therefore, a breach of fiduciary duty claim would be the appropriate
means to prosecute a minister who leads congregants into an affinity
fraud scheme.
State involvement in clergy misconduct is permissible under
the Constitution. 20 4 Courts have held that purely secular conduct can
give rise to a clergy members' liability on third parties, 20 5 but state
courts have split on the extent to which clergy can be liable for breach
of fiduciary duty. 206 Such an analysis relies on a relationship of
emotionally and spiritually by following his advice. In addition, claiming negligence against a
member of the clergy is not actionable if the court must inquire into religious doctrine to arrive
at a conclusion, see Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998). First
Amendment protections are limited, however, if a minister holds himself out to be a
professional marriage counselor, notwithstanding his use of scripture to counsel, and is
therefore held to a professional, not religious, standard of care. See id. Most of the cases
involving breach of fiduciary duty to-date occur in the context of sexual misconduct between
clergy and congregants during pastoral counseling.
203. See generally Eric C. Funston, Made Out of White Cloth: A ConstitutionalAnalysis
of the Clergy MalpracticeConcept, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 507 (1983).
204. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). Courts have held that where the
activities of a clergy member are religious in nature, the prohibition against state interference
is absolute. See Molko v Holy Spirit Ass'n. for the Unification of World Christianity, 762
P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988), in which the court was not permitted to interfere with the church's belief
system or analyze its merits. Conversely, if those activities are non-ecclesiastical in nature,
the state may become involved. See Van Schaick v Church of Scientology, Inc. 535 F.Supp.
1125, 1135, 1139 (D. Mass. 1982) (finding a church liable for fraudulent misrepresentations
entirely secular in nature).
205. For example, the Supreme Court of Colorado has allowed claims for breach of
fiduciary duty when those claims were non-ecclesiastical in nature. See Moses v. Diocese of
Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993). An Oregon Court has also determined that claims of
breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress were not barred by the
First Amendment. See Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). Courts
have also recognized claims for intentional torts by clergy, such as the circumstances in
Ballard, in which a minister was found guilty of receiving obtaining gifts or donations of
money by fraud, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); sexual assault, Mutual Service Cas. Ins. Co. v. Puhl, 354
N.W.2d 900, 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); unlawful imprisonment, Whitaker v. Sandford, 85 A.
399, 399 (Me. 1912); alienation of affections, Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 555 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987); and for sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
defamation, Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 785-86 (Okla. 1989). See Zanita E.
Fenton, Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice, & Sexual Abuse by Clergy, 8 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 45 n.47 and accompanying text.

206. Cf Lee, supra note 199. Lee asserts that this is an impermissible encroachment on
religious freedom.
But see F.G. v. MacDonnell, 696 A.2d 697 (holding that a parishioner
had a supportable claim against rector for breach of fiduciary duty based on an inappropriate
sexual relationship administered during pastoral counseling).
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special confidence between minister and congregant, which is a
necessary precondition to finding a breach of fiduciary duty.20 7 Some
courts have allowed the state to find clergy negligent when counseling
members of churches because they owe those members a fiduciary
duty.20 8 In such circumstances, a secular standard-the same
"relationship of special trust" that is articulated in a corporations
context-is applied to clergy when assessing whether a fiduciary duty
has been breached. 20 9 The plaintiff must show that she was in a
situation of dependence and reposed trust or confidence in the member
of the clergy. 21 In such cases, the ecclesiastical component of the
communication is ignored. In addition, courts have held that a blanket
legal duty cannot be imposed on individuals based on their title as an
ordained member of a religious body.2 1' Whether a duty of special
trust has been established between clergy and congregant must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. 212
State courts have held religious leaders liable for affinity fraud
and enhanced their punishment because of the fiduciary duty imposed

207. See Mac Donnell, 696 A.2d 697, 703-04. "The essence of a fiduciary relationship is
that one party places trust and confidence in another who is in a dominant or superior
position."
208. See Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310.
209. See F.G. v. MacDonnell, 696 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1997) (holding that the First
Amendment does not protect a minister from being held liable for sexual advances made
during marital counseling). The primary concern is whether there is a duty of special trust or
confidence, and that relationship has been breached. See Mabus v. St. James Episcopal
Church, 2004 WL 2249405, at *8. This standard applies in all cases of breach of fiduciary
duty, including the law of corporations.
210. See Mabus, 2004 WL 2249405, at *8. The Mississippi Supreme Court examined
whether the plaintiff was either dependent or instilled a special trust or confidence in the
minister. This was determinative of whether there was a fiduciary duty between congregant
and minister, and whether the plaintiff was put in a "vulnerable position."
211. See Doe v. Dunbar, 718 So.2d 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). See also Dausch v.
Ryske, 52 F3d. 1425 (7th Cir. 1994); Lee, supra note 196.
Both cases find it impermissible
for a member of the clergy to have given negligent pastoral advice and therefore liable for
breach of fiduciary duty in a counseling setting, because the relationship between clergy and
church member had a solely an ecclesiastical basis and was therefore barred by the First
Amendment. See also Mabus, 2004 WL 2249405, at *10, holding "a priest may not be held to
be in a fiduciary relationship merely based on his status as a priest." In other words, there
must be a relationship of special trust.
212. See Alexander v. Culp, 705 N.E.2d. 378, 382 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. 1997), in which a
woman sought counseling from a priest, who subsequently divulged to her husband the
information during the counseling session. The court found the woman had a claim for breach
of confidentiality. See also Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169, 1179
(N.D. Tex. 1995), in which the court held whether there was a fiduciary relationship between a
minister and a congregant was a fact determinable by a jury.
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on them as members of the clergy. In United States v. Lily213 a
minister's punishment was enhanced because of his role as both the
head of a spiritual institution and also its financial adviser. 2 14 Second,
the minister's role as financial manager allowed him to defraud
parishioners out of $1.6 million; his role as the church's minister
215
heightened the trust inherent between himself and his congregation.
The circumstances in United States v. Luca 2 16 were very similar.
Because the minister used religious-based language when committing
the fraud, a member of the congregation indicated that he allowed his
down when the minister solicited money from the
guard to be let
217
congregation.
In the case of Financial Warfare, the pastor of the Maryland
church may have fallen victim to a natural and arguably "Christian"
trust of the outside minister. The presence of such an outside minister
creates an illusion of legitimacy with the pastor of the church and with
the congregation. For a victim-pastor whose flock is about to be
misled, the testimony of a fellow clergy member suggests that the
scam artist lives up to the promises he or she makes. The pastor of the
target church may have believed that Dukes and Hodge's plan was
legitimate, and the presence of the perpetrator-pastor allows the
victim-pastor to feel confident in giving financial advice to
congregants. However, because neither the visiting minister nor the
pastor of the church named by the Maryland Securities Commissioner
or SEC in any legal218action, their actual role in perpetrating the fraud is
purely speculative.

213.

37 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1994). See also HAZEN: SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note

47, at § 4.6 n.312 (summarizing the case as one in which "A church pastor selling certificates
of deposit to finance church expansion could not hide behind the First Amendment right to
free exercise of religion").
214. Id. at 1226-27.
215. Id. at 1227.
216. 183 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 1999).
217. Id. at 1027. See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3. The
sentencing guidelines detail that an "abuse of trust" provision applies to individuals who abuse
their position of trust, and the "charitable impulse" provision applies to individuals who
misrepresent they hold position in connection with charitable organization. The "abuse of
trust" provision could easily apply to the visiting minister, see supra note 62, who used his

position to convince his congregants of the authenticity and veracity of Dukes and Hodge.
The "charitable impulse" provision could apply to Dukes and Hodge, who claimed to be
placing investors' funds in companies which would return charitably to the African American
community. See supra note 120 (discussing recent changes to the guidelines).
218.

See supra note 64.
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Often times, if the victim-pastor is "paid out" first, this
provides congregants with tangible evidence-especially if the
proceeds are used by the minister or pastor for consumer goods, like a
new automobile-that the pastor or minister is somehow getting
rich. 1 9
Because scam artists often come from outside a
congregation,220 their affinity with targeted congregants needs to
established. During Financial Warfare's presentation, the outside
minister's presence may have served to manipulate the church's own
pastor and to increase the credibility of Dukes and Hodge. The pitch
would have been easier to make had they been congregants; they
would have been seen in church and fellow church members would
have known their parents, siblings, and children. 22 1 Scammers outside
the congregation have to work harder and typically utilize church
leaders, usually the minister or pastor, to create a sense of trust within
the church community in order to entice congregants to invest with
them.
2. Hiding Behind the ConstitutionalProtection of Freedom of
Religion
As noted above, 222 Financial Warfare frequently used scriptural
references to target victims of their investment scam. As explained
below, courts probably would not recognize a cause of action based on
whether those scriptural references actually supported the financial
assertions made in the presentation. However, material misstatements
about the credibility of Dukes and Hodge as investment advisers, or
the financial "soundness" of Financial Warfare's investments, if made
by clergy members, would not be protected by the fact they were made
by a member of the clergy. Thus, the First Amendment would not bar
individuals for being liable for fraud, even if that fraud was conducted
in the context of a religious meeting or service, and involved
references to religious texts designed to create an affinity between
scam artist and congregant.

219.

See supra note 11 (describing Ponzi schemes).

220. For example, the recent case of affinity fraud at the United Christian Church in
Palmdale, CA, involved an individual who came to the church from outside the congregation.
Likewise, the pastor of a church can be convinced by a scam artist-minister that he is
trustworthy. See Reckard, supra note 16. See also supra note 64.
221.
See supra note 64.
222. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.

404

U. of Md. L. J. ofRace, Religion, Gender & Class

[Vol. 4:365

United States v. Ballard is the only Supreme Court opinion
addressing criminal prosecution for fraud in a church setting. 12 The
defendants claimed to have supernatural healing powers 224 which, the
indictment charged, were made knowing they were false. 225 The
District Judge instructed the jury that, although the statements were
probably untrue as facts 226 and the healing performed by the
defendants unlikely, 27 they were not permitted to consider them in
their verdict. 228 Rather, they must determine whether the defendants
"honestly and in good faith" believed these statements. 229 If the
defendants believed them, the judge reasoned, the defendants should
be given an acquittal, and, if not, they should be found guilty. 230 The
sole criterion on which the defendants could be found guilty, the judge
explained, was whether they used the mail to defraud others,.23 ' and
the jury found them guilty. 232 Reversing the Court of Appeals'
decision2 33 that the jury should have considered the truth or falsity of
the statements, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court.
Writing for the court, Justice Douglas asserted that assessing
the probability of the statements made by the group amounted to a trial
for heresy. 2 34 Douglas noted that the question was whether the district
court had correctly suppressed the question of validity of the
defendants' beliefs, and reiterated that the appropriate test-commonly
called the "sincerity of belief test"-was whether the defendants
235
"honestly and sincerely believed" that they were telling the truth.
This has been applied in subsequent cases with limited success both by
237
the Supreme Court 236 and lower courts.

223. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). The religious movement in Ballard was called "I Am" and
leaders were selected by divine will by the 'ascertained masters' to bring the words of the
"divine entity" to residents of California. Id. at 79-80.
224. See id. at 81. For example, Guy Ballard, one of the defendants, claimed to be 'Saint
Germain, Jesus, George Washington, and Godfre Ray King." Id. at 79.
225. See id. at 80.
226. See id. at 80.
227. Id. at 80.
228. Id. at 81.
229. 322 U.S. 78, 81.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 81-82.
232. Id. at 81.
233. See United States v. Ballard, 35 F. Supp. 105 (D.C. Cal 1940).
234. 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
235. Id. at 83.
236. See 289 U.S. 829.
237. See, e.g., Mejia-Paiz v. I.N.S., F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1996).
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The "sincere belief' test was further clarified in Tilton v.
Marshall238 in which a Texas Court found that a televangelist could be
liable for fraud that could be proven through concrete acts-for
example, whether a minister actually prayed over someone to cure her
ailment 23 9 -but not for claims based on a "statement of religious
doctrine or belief., 240 Had Tilton promised to read scripture and pray
for the wheelchair-bound individual and congregants, based on this
fact, donated money, a jury could only determine if the minister
prayed over the individual and base liability for fraud on the act of
praying. 241 Congregants could not recover if the minister failed to
heal the individual.
The second category distinguished in Tilton-representations
based on "religious doctrine or belief"'-includes lobbying
congregants to give money to the church, or, by extension, invest
money with the church, and basing those donations on scripture.
These are representations originating in religious doctrine, and a claim
of fraud will fail based on this theory. 242 This rule, when applied to
Financial Warfare, would lead to the conclusion that the defendants'
claims that they had sat together and found "unity scriptures" and
"wealth gospels" before the presentation at the Maryland church could
be proved or disproved, but whether God instructed them that a Bible
passage justified their financial scheme could not be a basis for a fraud
claim.
Perpetrators of affinity fraud often seamlessly blend scripture
into their sales pitch,24 3 as a means of convincing victims that "God is
Yet, as Ballard and Tilton indicate,
sanctioning the scheme."
is part and parcel of the scam,
scripture
that
whether
regardless of
perpetrators of affinity fraud cannot hide behind the Constitution.
Moreover, mixing financial rhetoric and scripture cannot allow a
minister to escape liability for breach of fiduciary duty. Not only can
they not hide, but their punishments should be increased because of the
breach of special trust.

238.

925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996).

239.

Id. at 679.

240.
241.

Id.
Id. at 695-96.

242.
(1990).
243.

See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
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C. Affinity Fraudas a "Hate" Crime
State legislatures provide varying definitions of the term "hate
Examining state law leads to the conclusion that hate
crimes are broadly defined and include general criteria such as "ethnic
intimidation, '' 245 "intimidation based on bias or bigotry, ' ' 246 "malicious
*
29
harassment," 247 a ~"bias crime, ,248 simple
"intimidation, 24
or various
25
0
permutations of these terms.
Some states require violence as part of
their definition. 25' The federal guidelines, 252 as well as half of the
states,253 call for increased punishment if a defendant is found guilty of
a hate crime.
Economic offenses can also be prosecuted under hate crimes
statutes. Certainly, because the hate crimes statute applies to all
federal crimes, and because violations of securities laws and other
federal statutes can be the legal bases for causes of action, hate crimes
statutes can apply on their face. 4 Although the term "hate crime"
crime.,,244

244. See John S. Baker, Jr., U.S. v. Morrison and Other Arguments Against Federal
"Hate Crime" Legislation, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1191, 1201 (2000). Examples of "hate crime"
statutes can be found in Lisa M. Fairfax, The Thin Line Between Love andHate: Why AffinityBased Securities and Investment FraudConstitutes a Hate Crime, 36 U.C.DAVIS L. REv. 1073
n.129.
245. See generally COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-121 (West2004).
246. See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN §§ 53a-181j, 53a-181k, 53a-1811 (West
2004).
247. See generally IDAHO CODE § 18-7092 (Michie 2000).
248. See generally IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-5-1 (West2004).

249. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (2001).
250. For example, the New Jersey Statute uses "bias intimidation" as a criterion; N.J.
STAT. ANN § 2C: 16-1 (West 2004), Oklahoma defines hate crime as "malicious intimidation
or harassment" (OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT.21 § 850 (West 2001).
251. The Arkansas code adds "violence" as an option ("intimidation, harassment or
violence") ARK.CODE ANN. § 16-123-106 (Michie 2001); the Virginia Code requires "assault
and battery," VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (Michie 2001).
252. The UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3Al.1(a) requires that "if
the defendant intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of an offense of
conviction because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
gender, disability, or sexual orientation" his punishment should be increased by three levels.
Moreover, (b)(1) mandates "If the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the
offense was a vulnerable victim, increase by 2 levels." If "the offense involved a large
number of vulnerable victims, increase the offense level determined under subdivision (1) by 2
additional levels." See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES .MANUAL § 3A 1.1(a).

See

also supra note 120.
253. See Fairfax, The Thin Line, supra note 244, at 1079.
254. See H.R. REP.No. 103-244 (1993) (stating that "any federal offense can constitute a
hate crime").
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conjures up images of physical violence, 255 Congress has noted that
the hate crime sentencing enhancements specifically cover crimes like
money laundering and embezzlement, thus endorsing the use of hate
crime legislation for non-violent crime.256
The logical question is whether a member of a discernible
racial or religious group can target someone within that group and still
have their act constitute a hate crime. 257 At least one court has held
that intra-group crime does, in fact, fall under the statutes. 258 Inherent
in an intra-group crime is a disassociation from the group. For
example, in the case of In re Vladimir P., the defendant was found
liable for targeting a member of his own group because he failed to
disassociate himself from the others who were verbally assaulting their
victim with racial slurs. 259 This dissociation from the group may be
tied to the plaintiff-assailant's internalization of their own feelings of
racial inferiority. 26° Therefore, intra-racial animosity can, in fact,
constitute a hate crime because victims are targeted because of their
race, regardless of whether that race is shared with their assailants.
Although economic crimes are non-violent, they have
significant financial consequences for many individuals who lose
significant amounts of money. When individuals are targeted because
of their race or religious beliefs, even though they are not physically
injured, they may lose money which is necessary for retirement or
their daily existence. Moreover, minorities should be encouraged to
invest in the market. Capital markets give investors a chance to
participate in a color-blind society; African American dollars are the
same as white dollars in the market. If African Americans are more
reluctant to invest because of affinity fraud, or have actually lost
255. See Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of Hate, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 801-02 (noting
that the public perception of a hate crime is largely shaped by the way in which these crimes
are publicized).
256. See H.R. REP. No. 103-244 (1993).
257. See Fairfax, The Thin Line, supra note 244 at 1109. Fairfax notes that hate crime
statutes do not address whether intra-group crimes fall under the hate crime statute.
258. See In re Vladimir P. 670 N.E.2d 839, 841 (Ill App. 1996).
259. See id.
260. See Kenneth B. Clark & Mannie P. Clark, Racial Identification and Preference in
Negro Children, in READINGS INSOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 602 (Eleanor E. Maccoby et al., eds, 3d

ed. 1958). This is the classic study in which African American children were given dolls of
varying skin tone and were asked to select which were the "prettiest" and the "smartest." The
children selected the lighter skinned dolls. This study was followed up in 1988 in an
experiment which gave similar results. See Darlene Powell-Hopson & Derek S. Hopsin,
Implications of Doll Color Preferences Among Black Preschool Children and White
Preschool Children, 14 J. OF BLACK PSYCHOLOGY, 57, 57-63 (1988).
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money, they are victims of a racism perpetuated from within their own
group.

VI. CONCLUSION

The complex cultural and societal elements present among
African American church populations illustrate the need for an
increased punishment for race-based affinity fraud.
Enhanced
punishment for church leaders can be justified on several bases. What
makes affinity fraud such a strange phenomenon is its inherently
cannibalistic nature.
Worse, it is perpetrated by self-declared
Christians professing the "Word of God" in churches to others of faith.
This alone should warrant an increased punishment on the
basis that perpetrators of affinity fraud should not be forgiven either
because they are also African American (the logical extension of
which is that affinity fraud is not a racial-bias motivated crime) nor
should they be held to a regular level of culpability out of any notion
of Christian forgiveness. Affinity fraud in African American churches
is a blatantly discriminatory practice. What makes it particularly
despicable is the effect it has had on the Herculean efforts of African
American churches to build wealth in communities. In addition, the
relationship of special trust which exists between a minister and his
congregation warrants increased incentive for African American
church members to invest through their minister and others who the
minister has pre-screened and invited to speak at their church. When
these church members fall victim to con artists, they naturally will be
more reluctant to invest. Moreover, if African American church
members are consistently the victims of affinity fraud scams, the
increase in African American affluence will not lead to an increase in
investment and savings. Affinity fraud also stymies any progress that
is being made by African American churches investing charitably in
their communities. Lastly, churches need to make money and increase
wealth to help community organizations. This is especially prevalent
in African American churches reinvesting in communities where
poverty is a central link to so many social problems and reinvesting
capital back into the community is central to keeping the community
together.
A key justification for increasing punishment for perpetrators
of affinity fraud involves the history of the African American
churches, their unique role in the development of the African
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American economy, and the social reality they now occupy in
community development and charitable giving in the United States.
Knowing this history as part of an African American church or simply
by being African American and understanding the problem of the
"White Man's Wall Street," perpetrators of affinity fraud engage in the
most egregious form of racism. Rather than promote the wealth of
institutions which have served as a dominant force in charitable giving
to African American communities throughout American history,
perpetrators victimize the very organizations which have served their
own community. By preying on the fears of congregants, they aid in
keeping members of their own racial group who have struggled for
economic parity for centuries, fettered to "second class" status.
As noted above, pastors have a fiduciary duty to their
congregants to perform due diligence and research any individuals
who are coming to their parish to give financial presentations. When
these pastors are accessories in the scam, their position as pastor
should play a role in increased punishment as, by extending
themselves as a trustworthy source, they are preying on the
relationship of heightened trust recognized by society and by the law
between congregant and minister.
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